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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Anderson Memorial Hospital (“AMH”) first filed suit 
against W.R. Grace and its affiliates (“Grace”)1 in South 
Carolina state court in 1992, seeking class-wide redress for 
property damage caused by asbestos-containing products that 
Grace had manufactured.  Before the resolution of that 
litigation, Grace filed a petition for Chapter 11 protection.  
The Bankruptcy Court supervised nearly a decade of related 
litigation.  Most property damage claims against Grace had 
been settled by 2010, contingent on the approval of an 11 
U.S.C. § 524(g) trust and an injunction channeling property 
damage claims against Grace to that trust for payment.  
AMH, however, did not settle.  The Bankruptcy Court 
confirmed Grace’s reorganization, including a trust and 
channeling injunction, over AMH’s objections.  The District 
Court affirmed. 
AMH appeals from the orders confirming Grace’s 
Chapter 11 Plan and approving the trust and channeling 
injunction.  AMH argues that (A) the Plan does not meet the 
                                              
1
 Appellee Grace consists of sixty-two related 
corporate entities.  For ease of reference, the debtors are 
collectively referred to hereinafter as “Grace.” 
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requirements of § 524(g), which provides a mechanism for 
handling overwhelming asbestos-related liabilities in the 
Chapter 11 process, (B) the Plan fails to provide equal 
treatment pursuant to § 1123(a)(4), (C) Grace has not shown 
that the Plan was proposed in good faith pursuant to 
§ 1129(a)(3), and (D) Grace has not shown that the Plan is 
feasible pursuant to § 1129(a)(11).  On each of these issues, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
One aspect of Grace’s business is extracting natural 
resources, refining them, and converting them into 
manufactured materials used for building construction and 
insulation.  Since the 1980s, Grace has defended itself against 
hundreds of asbestos-related lawsuits filed by building 
owners seeking redress for the costs involved in removing 
Grace products. 
AMH owns a hospital complex in Anderson, South 
Carolina, that used Grace products in its construction.  In 
1992, AMH filed a class action lawsuit against Grace seeking 
compensation for asbestos-related property damage in South 
Carolina state court.  The South Carolina court struck out-of-
state class members from the AMH complaint—a decision 
that was not immediately appealable under South Carolina 
law.  Anderson Memorial Hosp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 1994 
WL 1744074 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug, 8, 1994).  AMH 
amended its complaint to exclude non-South Carolina 
buildings and to include damage caused by all kinds of 
asbestos-containing surfacing material produced by Grace.  
The South Carolina Circuit Court conditionally certified this 
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class in February 2001.  AMH Appendix (“AMHA”) at 
700193.  Grace sought Chapter 11 protection two months 
later on April 2, 2001, before notice of the South Carolina 
action had issued to class members. 
Early in the Chapter 11 proceedings, Grace sought to 
establish a bar date for property damage claims and a process 
for handling related litigation.  In April 2001, personal injury 
(“PI”) and property damage (“PD”) committees were 
appointed.  The Bankruptcy Court requested proposals in 
May 2001 for case management plans and the scheduling of 
the asbestos-related claims. 
After the March 31, 2003 deadline for filing claims 
was established, more than 4,000 traditional PD claims were 
filed.
 2
  Speights & Runyan (“S&R”), counsel for AMH, filed 
three proofs of claim, including a worldwide class claim, a 
statewide class claim, and an individual claim.  S&R attached 
                                              
2
 In addition to traditional PD claims, Grace also faced 
Zonolite Attic Insulation (“ZAI”) claims based on damages 
from a loose-fill attic insulation manufactured by Grace that 
allegedly contained asbestos.  The ZAI litigation included a 
“science trial” (where court-appointed counsel represented 
the individual claimants, at Grace’s expense) and a 
Bankruptcy Court ruling that, although ZAI did contain some 
asbestos, it did not pose an unreasonable risk.  After this 
decision, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement 
(negotiated in September 2008) that would allow future US 
ZAI PD claims to be channeled to the Asbestos PD Trust as 
part of Class 7B. 
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a list of 3,000 putative claimants (including 121 South 
Carolina claimants) to its worldwide class claim.  S&R also 
filed an individual proof of claim for each of the potential 
class members it could identify through Grace’s sales records.  
Grace asserts that approximately 2,000 of the individual 
claims were filed without any authority from the purported 
claimant. 
Grace filed a Notice of Intent to Object to the PD 
claims, and some claimants then came forward to object that 
AMH’s counsel had filed claims in their names without 
authorization.  Grace asked S&R to withdraw these claims.  
The number of PD claims was ultimately reduced from more 
than 4,000 to 1,670, in part because S&R withdrew 586 
claims improperly filed on behalf of class claimants and 
1,500 claims that lacked an evidentiary basis.  S&R also 
withdrew approximately 550 additional claims for various 
other reasons.  The parties litigated some additional claims in 
which S&R’s authority was questioned; the Bankruptcy Court 
disallowed those claims, a ruling that the District Court and 
this Court later affirmed.  In re W.R. Grace & Co., 366 B.R. 
302 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007), aff’d, Mission Towers v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., 2007 WL 4333817 (D. Del. Dec. 6, 2007), 
aff’d, In re W.R. Grace & Co., 13 F. App’x 134 (3d Cir. 
2009).  In response to these objections, AMH moved for class 
certification.  That motion was denied on May 29, 2008, and 
the District Court declined to give leave to appeal—a ruling 
we declined to review on an interlocutory basis.  In re W.R. 
Grace & Co., 389 B.R. 373, 380 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008), leave 
to appeal denied, In re W.R. Grace & Co., 2008 WL 
4234339, *2 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2008), interlocutory appeal 
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denied, In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. 08-4829 (3d Cir. Dec. 
14, 2009). 
Throughout the Chapter 11 process, various parties 
engaged in settlement negotiations.  In fall 2004, an initial 
settlement effort including S&R failed.  In 2006, the late 
District Judge Samuel Pointer led a mediation including S&R, 
but the parties did not reach a settlement. 
In fall 2006, Grace began to litigate the remaining PD 
claims.  All but 90 of these claims had been withdrawn, 
disallowed, or settled (contingent on the confirmation of a 
§ 524(g) plan) by February 2009.  By the time the District 
Court issued its opinion in 2012, Grace had settled a total of 
407 PD claims (including 119 PD claims S&R agreed to 
settle) for approximately $150.8 million to be paid in full on 
the Plan’s effective date, assuming a § 524(g) trust is 
approved. 
With the consent of the committee of asbestos PD 
claimants, Plan Proponents obtained the appointment of 
Judge Alexander Sanders as a representative of future PD 
claimants.  Plan Proponents negotiated with Judge Sanders 
and came to an agreement regarding the Plan’s treatment of 
traditional PD claims.  Successive drafts of the Plan were 
circulated to all counsel, and comments were invited.  AMH 
did not provide comments.  AMH, for its part, asserts that the 
Plan was actually the result of a deal negotiated in April 2008 
by Grace, the Equity Committee, the PI Committee, the PI 
future claims representative, and the PI lead negotiator—all 
without PD participation. 
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 The Plan was filed on February 27, 2009 and 
subsequently amended several times.  With respect to the 
present and future traditional (non-ZAI) asbestos PD claims 
making up Class 7A, it provides: 
“(i) Treatment of Claims in Class 7A.  Each 
Holder of an Asbestos PD Claim in Class 7A 
that is Allowed as of the effective date pursuant 
to a PD Settlement Agreement, or other 
stipulation, order, or agreement, shall be paid 
the Allowed Amount of its Allowed Asbestos 
PD Claim in Cash in full by the Asbestos PD 
Trust as and when due, without any deduction, 
proration, reduction, setoff or discount, pursuant 
to the terms of the respective PD Settlement 
Agreements, or other stipulation, order, or 
agreement, and the terms of the Asbestos PD 
Trust Agreement (which Asbestos PD Trust 
shall be deemed by this Plan, the Confirmation 
Order, and the Asbestos PD Trust Agreement to 
have assumed the obligations of such PD 
Settlement Agreements).  Unresolved Asbestos 
PD Claims shall be paid pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
 
(A) In connection with confirmation of the Plan, 
the Court shall enter the Class 7A CMO [i.e., 
case management order]; and 
 
(B) Allowed Unresolved Asbestos PD Claims 
shall be paid in full, in Cash, by the Asbestos 
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PD Trust pursuant to the terms of the Asbestos 
PD Trust Agreement. 
 
(C) All Allowed Asbestos PD Claims in Class 
7A shall be paid in full by the Asbestos PD 
Trust solely from the Asbestos PD Trust Assets 
that are designated for Class 7A Claims. 
 
(D) The inclusion of Demands as Asbestos PD 
Claims in Class 7A and any reference to 
Demands related to Asbestos PD Claims in 
Class 7A in the Plan does not constitute an 
admission by the Debtors and the other Plan 
Proponents that an Entity which did not have an 
allowable Asbestos PD Claim in Class 7A 
against the Debtors as of the effective date 
could assert a valid claim against the Asbestos 
PD Trust contemplated under the Plan, and all 
rights and defenses to the allowance of such a 
claim by the Asbestos PD Trust are expressly 
reserved pursuant to the Plan.” 
Joint Appendix (“JA”) at 200078-79. 
Following the Plan’s effective date, the PD trust will 
be funded with the amount of cash specified in the Plan to 
pay allowed PD claims.  Reorganized Grace will have an 
ongoing obligation to fund the PD Trust for all traditional PD 
claims allowed in the future. 
Approximately 98.99 percent of Class 7A voted to 
accept the Plan.  JA at 201376.  AMH challenged the 
 15 
confirmation of the Plan.  At the confirmation hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Court heard evidence on, among other things, the 
issue of good faith.  AMH suggests that Grace essentially put 
on no evidence to support the conclusion that the Plan was 
filed in good faith and instead asserted that good faith could 
be determined based on the documents themselves.  Grace’s 
assistant general counsel, Richard Finke, was eventually 
called to testify, but the Bankruptcy Court concluded that if 
he were allowed to give testimony on Grace’s intentions 
throughout the Chapter 11 proceeding, the confirmation 
hearing would have to be continued to allow for discovery on 
the negotiating process.  The Plan Proponents did not then 
offer Finke’s testimony but instead offered the pre-negotiated 
proffer that did not delve into Plan Proponents’ subjective 
intent. 
The Bankruptcy Court also heard evidence on the 
Plan’s compliance with the statutory requirements for 
channeling asbestos claims to a trust.  A § 524(g) injunction 
is only appropriate where the debtor is likely to be subject to 
significant future demands.  Plan Proponents offered the 
testimony of economist Dr. Denise Martin on this issue.  Dr. 
Martin analyzed future events that might trigger additional 
property damage demands.  She testified that Grace was 
likely to be subject to substantial future demands, but that the 
amount and timing of those demands could not be 
determined.  The Bankruptcy Court credited her testimony. 
Additionally, investment banker Pamela Zilly testified 
as an expert on the feasibility of the Plan, concluding that the 
Plan is feasible “in light of Grace’s historical performance, 
reasonable projections, management initiatives, and proposed 
 16 
exit financing.”  Grace Br. at 17; see also JA at 201747.  
Although Grace’s internal projections valued future PD 
liabilities at $37.3 million,
3
 Zilly testified that Grace’s 
performance and financial track record would give the 
reorganized company the ability to satisfy up to $1.6 billion 
in asbestos PD liabilities over 25 years if necessary. 
Over AMH’s objections, the Plan was confirmed.  The 
District Court affirmed the Confirmation Orders on appeal.  
In re Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34 (D. Del. 2012), superseding 
In re W.R. Grace & Co., 468 B.R. 81 (D. Del. 2012).  In light 
of our decision in Wright v. Owens Corning, 679 F.3d 101 
(3d Cir. 2012), AMH asked the District Court to reconsider 
its opinion.  The District Court declined on July 23, 2012.  In 
re W.R. Grace & Co., 476 B.R. 114 (D. Del. 2012).  AMH’s 
timely appeal of the District Court’s affirmance of the 
Confirmation Orders and of its denial of its motion for relief 
followed. 
II. 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334(b), and the District 
Court had appellate jurisdiction over the Bankruptcy Court 
decision under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) and 1334(b).  We have 
                                              
3
 Grace has established a reserve account in this 
amount to cover future PD claims and any defense costs 
associated with litigating those claims after the Plan’s 
effective date.  The record does not indicate how Grace 
arrived at its $37.3 million projection. 
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jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
“We review the District Court’s conclusions of law de novo, 
its factual findings for clear error, and its exercise of 
discretion for abuse thereof.”  In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 
391 F.3d 190, 214 n.19 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III. 
AMH appeals from the District Court’s affirmance of 
the Bankruptcy Court orders confirming Grace’s Chapter 11 
Plan of reorganization and approving a trust and channeling 
injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).  AMH argues that (A) 
the Plan does not meet the requirements of § 524(g), (B) the 
Plan fails to provide equal treatment, (C) Grace has failed to 
demonstrate that the Plan was proposed in good faith, and (D) 
Grace has not shown that the Plan is feasible.  Each of these 
objections fails, and we will affirm the District Court. 
A. 
Section 524(g) provides a mechanism that allows 
companies to handle overwhelming present and future 
asbestos liability through a trust created in conjunction with a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan.  See Katherine M. Anand, Note, 
Demanding Due Process: The Constitutionality of the § 524 
Channeling Injunction and Trust Mechanisms That 
Effectively Discharge Asbestos Claims in Chapter 11 
Reorganization, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1187, 1192 (2005).  
AMH argues that the reorganization plan does not comply 
with the statutory requirements for a § 524(g) injunction and 
trust because (1) Grace did not demonstrate that it was likely 
to be subject to future PD demands, (2) Grace did not 
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demonstrate that the plan’s procedures were necessary to deal 
equitably with claims and future demands, and (3) the 
procedures treat similar claims differently.  For the reasons 
discussed below, none of these arguments succeeds. 
1. 
An asbestos manufacturer may be entitled to use 
§ 524(g)’s trust mechanism if it “is likely to be subject to 
substantial future demands for payment arising out of the 
same or similar conduct or events that gave rise to the claims 
that are addressed by the injunction.”  § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I).  
AMH contends that Grace faces no future property damage 
demands. 
“Claim,” as described elsewhere in the Bankruptcy 
Code, means a “right to payment, whether or not such right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(5).  
Section 524(g)(5) defines “demand” as a “demand for 
payment, present or future, that— 
(A) was not a claim during the proceedings 
leading to the confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization; 
(B) arises out of the same or similar conduct or 
events that gave rise to the claims addressed by 
the injunction issued under paragraph (1); and 
(C) pursuant to the plan, is to be paid by a trust 
described in paragraph (2)(B)(i).” 
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§ 524(g)(5) (emphasis added). 
In AMH’s reading of the statute, claims and demands 
are mutually exclusive because a demand “was not a claim 
during the proceedings leading to the confirmation of a plan 
of reorganization” and could be either dealt with in the 
ordinary course of the bankruptcy or not discharged at all.  
AMH contends that, although future demands are easily 
cognizable in the personal injury context, PD claims cannot 
result in future demands, because any buildings that contain 
asbestos already contain the material. 
AMH concedes that future PD demands existed under 
the definition of “claim” set out in Matter of M. Frenville Co., 
744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984).  There, we held that a claim 
arises when the underlying state-law cause of action accrues.  
Future PD claims could have existed if any potential claim 
from already-installed asbestos products had not, under 
various state laws, met the accrual requirements at the time 
potential claimants were notified of the bankruptcy.  Under 
the “mutual exclusivity” theory AMH proposes, these 
unaccrued actions were not “claims” and therefore could meet 
the “demand” definition of “not a claim before the bankruptcy 
court.”  Nonetheless, AMH argues that Frenville (which was 
the law of this Circuit at the time of the bar date notice and 
the confirmation hearing) should not control for several 
reasons. 
First, AMH argues that In re Grossman’s Inc., 607 
F.3d 114, 125 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc), supersedes Frenville 
on this issue by holding that “a ‘claim’ arises when an 
individual is exposed pre-petition to a product or other 
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conduct giving rise to an injury, which underlies a ‘right to 
payment’ under the Bankruptcy Code.”  Grossman’s 
explicitly overrules Frenville.
4
  Id. at 121. 
Second, AMH sees no basis in the evidence for the 
required finding that Grace is likely to be subject to 
substantial future demands, particularly when, in AMH’s 
view, the testimony of Dr. Martin, Grace’s sole witness for 
the idea that Grace was likely to be subject to substantial 
future PD demands, is best understood as using the term 
“demand” in the colloquial sense, as she explicitly stated she 
was not offering an opinion about the technical difference 
between a claim and a demand within the meaning of 
§ 524(g).
5
 
                                              
4
 AMH asked the District Court to reconsider its 
affirmance of the confirmation order in light of Wright v. 
Owens Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 2012).  The 
District Court declined, finding this new development in the 
law insufficient to create the extraordinary circumstances 
required for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b).  It also declined to intervene because AMH could seek 
the same relief as part of this appeal.  In re W.R. Grace & 
Co., 476 B.R. 114, 122 (D. Del. 2012). 
5
 AMH also argues that the Plan, as a matter of due 
process, cannot discharge the claims of property owners who 
would have held claims under the Frenville standard, but not 
under Grossman’s.  Because Frenville then controlled, AMH 
argues that Grace did not attempt to notify potential PD 
claimants who at the time of the bar date notice might have 
 21 
 Each of these objections fails.  First, we find no clear 
error that would justify disturbing the factual conclusion that 
there are property damage claimants who will seek redress in 
the future.  Dr. Martin testified, “The claims will be made.  
Yes, it’s my opinion that there will be substantial – 
substantial claims will be made.”  JA at 201784-85.  Expert 
                                                                                                     
had impacted property but whose claims had not yet accrued 
under state law.  AMH contends that, if these claims are to be 
discharged, the claim holders are entitled to participation in 
the process, including voting on the Plan.  We do not see how 
this line of argument advances AMH’s contention that Grace 
is not likely to face future property damage demands.  Indeed, 
it seems to be wholly unrelated to that argument, as the due 
process implications of discharging a claim are entirely 
separate from the question of whether future demands—
which, by AMH’s reading, are by definition not claims—are 
likely to be brought.  In any event, AMH does not contend 
that its due process rights have been violated by the Plan, nor 
could it, as it participated extensively throughout the 
bankruptcy proceeding and had the opportunity to vote. 
 Therefore, as “litigants in federal court are [generally] barred 
from asserting the constitutional rights of others,” In re PWS 
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 248 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), AMH lacks standing to raise that 
argument in this appeal.  See id. (explaining that “limits on 
third-party standing are particularly relevant to appellate 
standing in bankruptcy proceedings” because “[b]ankruptcy 
proceedings regularly involve numerous parties, each of 
whom might find it personally expedient to assert the rights 
of another party”).” 
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testimony sufficiently supported the claim that Grace will be 
subject to future demands and that AMH failed to provide 
evidence to the contrary, though it had the opportunity to do 
so.  The Bankruptcy Court credited this expert testimony, 
noting the distinction between the existence of the demands 
and whether they will ultimately be allowed.  In re W.R. 
Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 144 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
Second, we conclude that property damage future 
claims can exist as a matter of law.  We reject AMH’s 
assertion that Grossman’s eliminated the category of future 
holders of demands, as Grossman’s concerned the definition 
of claims and expressly stated that the plan at issue was not a 
§ 524(g) plan.  Congressional intent to allow a debtor to 
“emerge free and clear of the entire universe of asbestos 
liabilities,” as evidenced by the statute’s reference to present 
and future demands, underscores this point.  Grace Br. at 24 
(citing 140 Cong. Rec. at 14461, S514462 (October 6, 1994) 
(Sen. Heflin)).
6
 
The Bankruptcy Court handled a similar statutory 
construction argument in In re Flintkote Co., 486 B.R. 99, 
124 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).  The Flintkote court concluded 
                                              
6
 We place no importance on AMH’s claims that 
Grace’s counsel expressed a belief that there are no future PD 
claims.  See AMHA at 700559-662.  In the discussion AMH 
quotes, counsel appears to be referring to the merits of future 
demands rather than their existence.  Even if we were to 
interpret the transcript as an admission, Grace’s subjective 
belief should not change our statutory interpretation here. 
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that the reference to demands in § 524(g) was ambiguous and 
that a literal application of the term would produce results at 
odds with the legislature’s intent.  Responding to the 
suggestion that claim and demand are mutually exclusive, the 
court stated that 
“‘demand’ in § 524(g)(5) describes a ‘present or 
future’ demand for payment, and given the 
expansive definition of ‘claim’ in § 101(5), the 
Court cannot fathom a situation where an 
individual could hold a ‘present’ demand for 
payment that is not technically a ‘claim’ under 
§ 101(5).  Thus [if demand and claim are treated 
as mutually exclusive], the qualifier, ‘present or 
future [demand],’ in § 524(g)(5) is superfluous, 
and ‘[i]t is a well known canon of statutory 
construction that courts should construe 
statutory language to avoid interpretations that 
would render any phrase superfluous.’” 
 
Flintkote, 486 B.R. at 124 (citation omitted).  Additionally, 
Flintkote concluded that the position the creditor advanced 
there (which parallels AMH’s) would produce a result that 
contravened congressional intent.  In the Bankruptcy Court’s 
description, because asbestos-related illnesses have a long 
latency period, Congress created the § 524(g) trust 
mechanism in order to protect the due process rights of 
people who had been exposed but not yet affected, and who 
might not manifest injury until a time when all available 
compensation had been paid out to people who got sick faster.  
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Section 524, therefore, improves equality of treatment among 
claimants.  Id. at 124-25. 
The Bankruptcy Court explained that, “because 
asbestos production in this country largely ceased many 
decades ago,” id. at 125, it may be difficult, if not impossible, 
for a debtor to demonstrate it will “likely be subject to 
substantial future demands” under the creditor’s proposed 
interpretation of “claim” and “demand.”  That interpretation 
would therefore prevent many debtors from qualifying for the 
protection of § 524(g), which would “defeat[] the purpose of 
the statute by removing the protections for ‘exposed yet 
unimpaired’ asbestos creditors and depriving them of just 
compensation for their future injuries and illnesses.”  Id. at 
123.  Thus, the Bankruptcy Court affirmed in Flintkote its 
earlier conclusion in this case that “future demand holders are 
those who have been exposed to asbestos but whose disease 
or other injury, sufficient to prove damages, has not yet 
manifested.”  In re W.R. Grace, 446 B.R. 96, 130 n.58 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
AMH’s argument that there is no such thing as a future 
PD demand has some intuitive appeal.  After all, asbestos 
installation has long-since ceased, so every building that will 
be damaged by asbestos already contains it.  As a policy 
matter, the rationale for the § 524(g) trust mechanism is less 
clear here than in the personal injury context; if all property 
damage has occurred and those harmed can be notified, the 
ordinary claims process could arguably meet Congress’s 
objectives of promoting equal treatment of claimants and 
allowing manufacturers to handle asbestos liability in an 
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orderly and streamlined process.
7
  This supports AMH’s 
statutory interpretation, which emphasizes the “not a claim” 
language, giving “claim” in § 524(g) the same meaning it was 
assigned in Frenville and then Grossman’s interpretations of 
the word claim in § 101(5).  As AMH describes property 
damage, if we applied the Grossman’s test, the pre-petition 
exposure clearly makes the property damage cases “claims” 
that AMH’s reading of § 524(g) excludes from the “demands” 
covered by the trust. 
Ultimately, however, AMH’s arguments must fail.  
Section 524(g) explicitly states that the asbestos trusts can 
cover property damage, so an interpretation that makes such 
trusts impossible cannot be consistent with congressional 
intent.  Furthermore, as the Bankruptcy Court demonstrated, 
AMH’s “mutual exclusivity” theory would effectively read 
the category of present demands out of the statute.  For these 
reasons, we affirm the District Court’s conclusion that 
                                              
7
 AMH states in its brief that only one other asbestos 
trust for property damage has been created and that it was 
established by the same bankruptcy judge handling this case.  
See In re United States Mineral Prods. Co., 2005 WL 
5887219 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).  In fact, other courts have 
created property damage trusts.  For example, a property 
damage trust was used in the Manville case that led Congress 
to draft § 524(g).  See Matter of Johns-Manville Corp., 68 
B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).  Additionally, an Eagle-
Picher Property Damage Trust compensated owners of 
buildings containing asbestos.  See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 
Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 279-82 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996). 
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because “[i]t still remains unknown (and may never be 
ascertained) how many entities and individuals were affected 
by these products, the precise quantity of asbestos-laden 
products that were sold, which buildings the products were 
used in and how much was used per building, or the 
percentage of these entities that have successfully removed 
the asbestos products from their buildings,” “there remains a 
significant chance that future property damage claims will be 
asserted against Grace by property damage claimants.”  In re 
W.R. Grace Co., 475 B.R. 34, 101 (D. Del. 2012). 
2. 
Next, AMH argues that a trust under § 524(g) is 
unnecessary to equitably handle claims and future demands.  
See § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III) (“pursuit of such demands outside 
the procedures prescribed by such plan [must be] likely to 
threaten the plan’s purpose to deal equitably with claims and 
future demands”).  According to AMH, § 524(g)’s procedures 
were not required because the “trust” is “simply a conduit for 
the payment of funds by reorganized Grace, inserted 
primarily if not exclusively to obtain the benefits of the § 
524(g) injunction.”  AMH Br. at 38.  Under the Plan, the PD 
Trust will be funded on the Plan’s effective date with 
sufficient funds to pay the settled PD claims; if additional PD 
claims are later allowed, Grace will further fund the Trust.  
AMH contends that employing trust mechanisms under these 
circumstances is merely a pretext for directing litigation back 
to the Bankruptcy Court, effectively allowing Grace to forum-
shop and avoid defending its case in front of a jury. 
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Furthermore, AMH finds a “fundamental illogic” in 
“extending § 524(g) to claims that are supposedly 
‘unimpaired’ under the Plan” because there is no purpose to a 
trust, in AMH’s view, if claims are to be paid at 100 percent 
of their value.  AMH Br. at 39 (citing Barliant, Karcazes & 
Sherry, From Free-Fall to Free-For-All: The Rise of Pre-
Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. 
L. Rev. 441, 453 (Winter 2004)).  AMH contends that Grace 
provided no evidence that the pursuit of PD claims outside 
the Plan procedures would threaten the Plan when Grace has 
stated its intention to pay 100 percent of PD claims as they 
are resolved. 
 AMH's argument underestimates the importance of 
creating a mechanism to resolve all of Grace's present and 
future asbestos liabilities.  Outstanding, unresolved asbestos 
liability can make it extremely difficult for certain entities to 
amass operating capital, which can hinder a debtor's chances 
of long-term survival and, in turn, prevent equitable 
resolution of future asbestos claims.  For that reason, both the 
PI trust and the PD trust are necessary to protect the interests 
of future asbestos claimants, as together they provide a level 
of certainty calculated to position Grace to compensate future 
claimants.  See Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234 
(explaining that § 524(g) seeks to provide “an ‘evergreen’ 
source of funding to pay future claims” by allowing a debtor 
to emerge from Chapter 11 “cleansed of asbestos liability”). 
3. 
Finally, AMH argues that the trust procedures are not 
fair and equitable because similar present claims and future 
demands will not be paid “in substantially the same manner.”  
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§ 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V), (g)(4)(B)(ii).  Because this argument 
duplicates AMH’s broader claims of unequal treatment under 
both § 524(g) and § 1123(a)(4), these arguments are 
considered together in the following Part, which concludes 
that the equality requirement has been satisfied.  We 
conclude, therefore, that the plan meets the requirements of § 
524(g). 
B. 
“Equality of distribution among creditors is a central 
policy of the Bankruptcy Code.”  Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 
58 (1990).  Two Code provisions relevant in this case 
mandate some form of equality.  Section 1123(a)(4) requires 
a plan to “provide the same treatment” for each claim or 
interest in a class “unless the holder of a particular claim or 
interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular 
claim or interest.”  Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) requires the 
adoption of procedures that “provide reasonable assurance 
that the trust will value, and be in a financial position to pay, 
present claims and future demands that involve similar claims 
in substantially the same manner.”  AMH argues that the Plan 
should not have been confirmed because it treats AMH 
substantially differently than other similarly situated creditors 
by denying AMH the opportunity to litigate in its chosen state 
forum, outside the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court.  
Considering the Plan as an “integrated whole,” the District 
Court found that the Bankruptcy Court had properly 
concluded that the Plan met these equality requirements.  In 
re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 124 (D. Del. 2012). 
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The District Court adopted the test that equal treatment 
under § 1123(a)(4) requires that “all creditors in a given class 
must receive equal value for their claims and must pay the 
same degree of consideration for their distribution under the 
trust.”  W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 140 (citing In re 
Quigley Co., Inc., 377 B.R. 110, 116 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(citing In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 
1986))).  The reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit persuades us that “[i]t is disparate treatment when 
members of a common class are required to tender more 
valuable consideration—be it their claim against specific 
property of the debtor or some other cognizable chose in 
action—in exchange for the same percentage of recovery.”8  
AOV, 792 F.2d at 1152. 
In Combustion Engineering, 391 F.3d at 239, we 
remanded for further record development where a two-trust 
structure could have potentially favored claimants to one trust 
over claimants to the other.  The record then before us raised 
concerns about certain pre-petition settlements that led to the 
creation of a $400 million trust for the payment of claims.  Id. 
at 240-42.  Creditors who drew on the trust retained a “stub 
                                              
8
 That is not to say that members of a class must 
receive the same amount of money for their claims.  See In re 
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 749 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“Without question, the ‘same treatment’ standard of 
section 1123(a)(4) does not require that all claimants within a 
class receive the same amount of money.”).  Rather, the 
claimants in a class must simply have the same opportunity 
for recovery.  Id. 
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claim” that allowed them to vote on the bankruptcy plan, 
which included a § 524(g) injunction.  Id. at 201.  We 
concluded that the creation of stub claims may have the result 
of artificially gerrymandering classes called upon to vote on a 
plan, adding claimants to the class who have already received 
more than they would have under the plan and thus have little 
incentive to scrutinize it before voting.  Id. at 243-44. 
AMH urges us to follow In re Dow Corning Corp., 
280 F.3d 648, 660 (6th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that 
§ 1123(a)(4) requires equality in procedural treatment.  There, 
the plan put governmental subrogation claims together into a 
class and would pay those claims in full in order to satisfy 
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)’s “cram down” requirements.  Id. at 659.  
Different procedural protections applied to different 
government units; the Canadian government entered into a 
settlement that allowed it to gain notice before payments were 
made to beneficiaries so that Canada could determine if a 
subrogation claim existed.  Id. at 660.  The Sixth Circuit held 
that this procedural guarantee, given only to Canada, meant 
that the United States did not receive equal treatment.  Id. 
Here, the District Court found that the Plan satisfied 
both prongs of the equal treatment test outlined in Quigley 
and AOV.  W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 140.  The District 
Court concluded that AMH’s assertion that it was giving up 
more than other class members by losing its forum option was 
incorrect, because everyone who filed a proof of claim 
submitted to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction—a necessity 
in order to maintain uniformity in treatment of claims in this 
highly technical area of law.  Id.  Even if litigating before the 
Bankruptcy Court were a true disadvantage, AMH voluntarily 
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submitted to it.  See Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 45 
(1990) (holding that Creditors submit themselves to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction by submitting a proof of 
claim). 
Here, AMH argues that the Joint Plan disadvantages it 
as compared to other Class 7A creditors because it is the only 
claimant that has been denied the right to pursue its case in its 
chosen forum.  Under the Plan, all current PD claimants must 
resolve their property damage claims before the Bankruptcy 
Court.  Future claimants may litigate their claims before a 
district court, potentially before juries. 
AMH suggests that the District Court erred because 
there are no similarly situated creditors left,
9
 because other 
asbestos claimants have either reached a settlement that will 
be paid on the Plan’s effective date, were subject to 
alternative resolution procedures with lowered proof 
thresholds, or were permitted to litigate in their chosen 
forums.  AMH says that it is the only claimant that “is 
required to litigate its claims in order to be entitled to 
payment, but is precluded from doing so in the forum it chose 
                                              
9
 As evidence that the CMO and Plan were not 
designed to single out AMH, Grace notes that when the PD 
CMO was proposed in December 2008, all 37 asbestos PD 
claimants remaining at that time were subject to the 
procedures.  When the CMO was revised in February 2009, it 
applied to 57 unresolved PD claims.  Since that time, 
“virtually all” PD claimants besides AMH have settled.  
Grace Br. at 8. 
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nearly a decade before this bankruptcy case was 
commenced.”  AMH Br. at 46.  Finally, AMH objects to the 
District Court’s finding that it submitted to the Bankruptcy 
Court’s jurisdiction because it had to file a proof of claim in 
order to protect its rights and “did so against the backdrop of 
repeated representations by Grace that pre-existing claims 
would be permitted to return to the tort system for 
resolution.”10  AMH Br. at 47. 
No claims under Class 7A will be handled via 
alternative dispute resolution or lower proof thresholds; if 
AMH is comparing itself to the US ZAI claimants, the 
distinction is immaterial because those claimants are part of 
Class 7B.  Regarding the other members of Class 7A, the 
future PD claimants represented by Judge Sanders, any 
difference between AMH and future claimants as to forum is 
meant to allay Seventh Amendment concerns and is not 
prejudicial. 
Ultimately, the only relevant comparison here is 
between AMH and other members of Class 7A, the future PD 
                                              
10
 AMH claims that Grace represented that AMH’s and 
similar claims would be “permitted to return to the tort 
system.”  Grace responds that those filings merely state that 
“Grace will identify pending cases that could continue to be 
litigated in other courts . . . ” and “[t]hat is in no way a 
‘representation’ that, after being extensively litigated in the 
Bankruptcy Court, AMH’s voluntarily filed class claim could 
returned to state court.”  See Grace Br. at 10 n.6 (citing PPA 
at 600935 ¶2, 600972, 601007). 
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claimants represented by Judge Sanders.
11 
 The only 
inequality AMH has identified is the ongoing jurisdiction of 
the Bankruptcy Court over AMH’s claims, which prevents 
AMH from returning to the state court system in order to try 
its claims before a jury.  AMH submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the Bankruptcy Court; future claimants will not have 
submitted, and thus will be free to file their cases in federal 
district courts.  See Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 44 (“[B]y filing 
a claim against a bankruptcy estate the creditor triggers the 
process of allowance and disallowance of claims, thereby 
                                              
11
 AMH does not argue that it should not have been 
placed in a class with the future claimants, with whom AMH 
seems to believe it has conflicting interests.  Moreover, AMH 
makes much of the fact that Judge Sanders described this as a 
“better deal” negotiated for the future claimants.  In fact, this 
statement tells us very little; the exchange did not even elicit 
from Judge Sanders why he thought this was a better deal.  
The record shows that Judge Sanders was stating that he had 
negotiated the right for future PD claimants, who have not 
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy 
Court, to seek redress in any district court with jurisdiction—
a solution he thought “better” and “more fair” than requiring 
all of those future cases to be filed in the District Court of 
Delaware.  In the next part of the questioning, having been 
asked to assume that AMH claims must remain in Bankruptcy 
Court, Judge Sanders responded to a somewhat 
incomprehensible non-question from AMH counsel with “My 
clients got a better deal than yours.”  AMHA at 700606-10. 
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subjecting himself to the bankruptcy court’s equitable 
power.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Future PD claimants cannot be bound to the 
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court in this way because they 
have not submitted proofs of claim granting the Bankruptcy 
Court jurisdiction and have not necessarily surrendered their 
rights to a jury trial.  AMH insinuates that it is a matter of 
convenience (i.e., future claimants can choose a district court 
that is closer to the property and witnesses needed), but the 
most reasonable inference from their persistence on this issue 
is that it believes it is likely to recover more from a South 
Carolina state jury.  AMH has not explained how being bound 
by the decision of the Bankruptcy Court leads directly to 
disadvantage in recovery, because to do so would lay bare 
assumptions about the fairness and adequacy of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s proceedings that it cannot support.  We 
conclude, therefore, that the Plan treats AMH sufficiently 
equally to other members of the same class to meet the 
requirements of §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4).  Even if we were 
to conclude that binding AMH to the jurisdiction of the 
Bankruptcy Court represented “less favorable” treatment of 
its claim, AMH “agree[d] to a less favorable treatment of 
such particular claim or interest” by submitting itself to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction via its proof of claim. 
C. 
Under § 1129(a)(3), courts may only confirm 
reorganization plans proposed in good faith.  “[T]he 
important point of inquiry is the plan itself and whether such 
a plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the 
 35 
objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”  In re Am. 
Capital Equip., LLC, 688 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 247) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Those objectives and purposes 
include “preserving going concerns and maximizing property 
available to satisfy creditors,” “giving debtors a fresh start in 
life,” “discourag[ing] debtor misconduct,” “the expeditious 
liquidation and distribution of the bankruptcy estate to its 
creditors,” and “achieving fundamental fairness and justice.”  
Am. Capital Equip., LLC, 688 F.3d at 156-57 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  Good faith presents 
mixed questions of law and fact; we review legal 
determinations de novo and factual determinations for clear 
error.  In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 242-43 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
In the view of the District Court, a good faith plan “(1) 
fosters a result consistent with the [Bankruptcy] Code’s 
objectives; (2) has been proposed with honesty and good 
intentions and with a basis for expecting that reorganization 
can be effected; and (3) [exhibited] a fundamental fairness in 
dealing with the creditors.”  W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 
88 (citing Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 609 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2001)).  The District Court concluded that the 
first factor had been satisfied because the Plan preserved 
Grace as a going concern in the face of overwhelming 
asbestos liability and, given the probability of forthcoming 
future claimants, gave Grace a better chance of being able to 
satisfy those claims.  W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 87-88.  
Second, the District Court described the requirements of 
honesty, good intentions, and a reasonable expectation of 
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success as assurances that “the Bankruptcy Code’s careful 
balancing of interests is not undermined by petitioners whose 
aims are antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy.”  Id. 
at 88 (quoting In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 
F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2004)).  The District Court concluded 
that nothing about the case suggested ulterior motives or 
dishonesty, particularly in light of the arms-length 
negotiations that led to the development of the Plan.  W.R. 
Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 89.  Third, the District Court again 
addressed AMH’s equality arguments, recast as a claim of 
fundamental unfairness, and concluded that the Plan was not 
fundamentally unfair. 
AMH asserts that the Plan fails to meet the good faith 
requirement for procedural and substantive reasons.  First, 
AMH implies that Grace had the burden of proof in 
demonstrating “good faith negotiations with AMH with 
respect to the procedures imposed on the holders of 
unresolved PD claims.”  AMH Br. at 50.  Second, AMH 
asserts substantive unfairness because the Plan provides 
preferential treatment to certain “favored” constituencies.  
According to AMH, Judge Sanders’s testimony that he was 
able to secure a “better deal” for the future PD claimants 
shows that AMH is suffering from the kind of disparity that 
 37 
raised questions meriting remand in Combustion 
Engineering.
12
 
We reject AMH’s arguments for several reasons.  
First, we find no support for the idea that the District Court 
clearly erred in its factual conclusion that the Plan resulted 
from “years of litigation and extensive arms-length 
negotiations.”  W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 89.  The 
settlements of virtually all of the non-AMH PD claims and 
the overwhelming vote by creditors in favor of the plan 
bolster this conclusion.  We reject AMH’s implication that 
Grace’s failure to negotiate directly with AMH undercuts the 
overall Plan’s fundamental fairness, particularly when AMH 
declined to provide comments on drafts of the Plan when they 
were circulated during the negotiation process.  See, e.g., PPA 
                                              
12
 Before us, AMH abandoned the argument it made to 
the District Court that the Plan fails the good faith 
requirement because Grace “repeatedly stymied” AMH’s 
efforts to take discovery on the good faith issue.  In any 
event, this argument lacks merit.  In In re Frascella Enter., 
Inc., 360 B.R. 435 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007), the court found 
that a plan was not proposed in good faith when the 
proponents had repeatedly avoided making necessary 
disclosures until forced to by the court.  The debtor’s history 
of transactions suggested that some disclosures had been 
manipulated, and voting creditors did not receive information 
about the plan until the day before the vote.  The District 
Court correctly concluded that no comparable behavior had 
occurred here.  In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 89 (D. 
Del. 2012). 
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at 600774-90, 601400-02, 601403-05, 601475-571.  
Furthermore, as the District Court emphasized, the 
Bankruptcy Court participated extensively in the settlement 
process and had an opportunity to observe the parties’ 
conduct.  W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 90. 
Second, we repeat our conclusion that AMH did not 
suffer from unfair inequality and note that a creditor’s 
disagreement about the handling of its claim does not 
necessarily evince bad faith by the Plan’s proponents.  See, 
e.g., In re Barnes, 309 B.R. 888, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) 
(“[T]he fact that a plan proposed by a debtor is not the one 
that the creditors would have proposed does not make the 
plan one that has not been filed in good faith.”) (citations 
omitted).  On the contrary, Chapter 11 reorganizations rest on 
majority rule and routinely leave a minority of creditors 
dissatisfied.  We note again that the Plan is designed to pay 
AMH’s allowed claims in full. 
Third, we reject AMH’s contention that direct 
testimony from Grace’s negotiators was required to 
demonstrate Grace’s honesty and good intentions in 
proposing the Plan.  Subjective intent, to the extent that it is 
one factor in determining that a Plan is not being used for 
purposes contrary to the Code’s objectives, is routinely 
established by circumstantial evidence.  A negative inference 
should not be drawn against Grace merely because it chose to 
protect the privacy of attorney-client communications.  For a 
variety of privilege and evidentiary reasons, divining the 
subjective intent of a corporate actor through the testimony of 
the negotiators and other key people will often prove 
problematic and less than enlightening.  In any event, it 
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would be an extraordinary circumstance where an objectively 
fair plan must be set aside because of mere suspicions 
concerning the subjective intent of the parties. 
Furthermore, the Plan has little in common with 
reorganization schemes that have been rejected for want of 
good faith.  In In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 43 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2004), the bankruptcy court adopted the view that good 
faith means the plan was “proposed with honesty, good 
intentions and a basis for expecting that a reorganization can 
be effected with results consistent with the objectives and 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. . . . with the most 
important feature being an inquiry into the fundamental 
fairness of the plan.”  There, the bankruptcy court found that 
the plan had not been proposed in good faith because it had 
been drafted primarily for the benefit of a pre-petition 
committee and memorialized a pre-petition settlement to the 
detriment of other claimants.  Id. 
Similarly, in Combustion Engineering we concluded 
that the use of stub claims potentially constituted “artificial 
impairment” under § 1129(a)(10) leading to serious doubt 
about whether the plan fulfilled the good faith requirement.  
391 F.3d at 243.  We remanded for further consideration of 
the issue in light of good faith.  Id. at 261.  Again, in In re 
Am. Capital Equip., LLC, applying the aforementioned good 
faith standard, we held that the plan lacked good faith because 
the proposed plan created an incentive for the debtor, a 
defunct business, to sabotage its own defense; severely 
limited insurers’ procedural rights; and unlike a § 524(g) 
trust, created a fund in which the debtor made no contribution 
– instead withdrawing money from it.  688 F.3d at 159-61. 
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In this case, Grace has demonstrated that the Plan is 
fair, and AMH has provided no real argument that the Plan 
was not “proposed with honesty and good intentions and with 
a basis for expecting that reorganization can be effected.”  
W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 87-88.  For these reasons, we 
affirm the District Court’s conclusion that the Plan was 
proposed in good faith. 
D. 
Grace had the burden of demonstrating that 
“[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the 
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of 
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, 
unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the 
plan.”  § 1129(a)(11).  Success need not be guaranteed, but 
must be reasonably likely.  Am. Capital Equip., LLC, 688 
F.3d at 156; see also Quigley, 437 B.R. at 142 (holding plan 
was not feasible where funding source was “speculative at 
best and visionary at worst”).  We consider feasibility in the 
context of ongoing litigation and will find a plan not feasible 
if it “hinges on future litigation that is uncertain and 
speculative, because success in such cases is only possible, 
not reasonably likely.”  Am. Capital Equip., 688 F.3d at 156 
(finding plan not feasible where its only source of funding 
was proceeds from highly speculative litigation winnings).  
The District Court agreed with the Bankruptcy Court’s factual 
conclusion—based on expert testimony, financial reports, 
estimates of Grace’s future earning capacity, current 
economic conditions, and Grace’s capital structure and 
earning power—that Grace had established a reasonable 
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likelihood of the Plan’s success.  W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 
at 115. 
AMH contends that Grace cannot meet its burden 
without establishing the amount of liability the Plan will need 
to satisfy in the future.  According to AMH, Grace’s 
feasibility expert relied only on Grace’s creation of a $37.7 
million reserve for PD liabilities and performed no 
independent analysis of the liabilities of the PD trust.
13
  
Without a clear picture of the trust’s estimated liabilities, 
AMH argues, Zilly’s testimony that a reorganized Grace 
would be able to fund as much as $1.6 billion over 25 years 
“proves nothing” because that figure has not been 
substantiated and because the Plan does not allow Grace to 
spread out its liabilities over 25 years, as Grace is required to 
fund that PD trust every six months in the amount of 
unresolved PD claims and future PD demands that were 
allowed during the preceding term.  Finally, AMH argues that 
Grace’s feasibility analysis did not account for the possibility 
that AMH class claims might be allowed.  See In re Harbin, 
486 F.3d 510, 517-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding clear error 
under § 1129(a)(11) when Bankruptcy Court failed to account 
                                              
13
 AMH offers a one-sentence argument that we should 
reject Zilly’s testimony because “expert testimony based on 
assumptions that are not supported by the record should have 
been excluded.”  AMH Br. at 52 (citing Elcock v. Kmart 
Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 756 (3d Cir. 2000)).  In fact, Elcock 
does not support AMH’s point because, in that case, the 
expert relied on information that was proven by the record to 
be false. 
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for possibility of large judgment against debtor in case on 
appeal at time of confirmation in its feasibility analysis).
14
 
None of these arguments leads us to conclude that the 
District Court clearly erred in affirming the Bankruptcy 
Court’s factual conclusion that the Plan would likely succeed.  
As the District Court noted, Grace needed only to 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success, not an 
absolute certainty.  Grace’s evidence, including Zilly’s 
testimony, remains uncontradicted.  AMH has produced no 
evidence supportive of its objection.
15
  AMH has offered no 
                                              
14
 Additionally, AMH contends that Plan proponents 
did not “re-evaluate the adequacy of notice after the change in 
law announced by Grossman’s, and now confirmed to be 
retroactive in effect by Owens Corning.”  AMH Br. at 56.  
Because under AMH’s reading of Grossman’s, property 
owners who have a Grace asbestos product in their property 
but whose state law claims have not yet accrued are claim 
holders whose cases cannot be channeled to the PD trust, 
AMH believes that the Plan will be threatened by the need to 
make non-trust payments it has not provided for.  Id.  As 
discussed above, we have rejected this reasoning. 
15
 AMH points to the testimony of a KPMG accountant 
hired by Grace in 1995 who estimated the size of Grace’s 
asbestos PD liability.  Because the report was outdated and 
contemporaneously rejected by Grace, the Bankruptcy and 
District Courts concluded that the report did not accurately 
reflect the current information about outstanding PD liability.  
AMH has offered no compelling reason why we should find 
this factual conclusion to be clearly erroneous. 
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estimate of the size of its class claim, which could possibly be 
allowed to proceed if we were to reverse the District Court in 
a separate appeal—and that event appears sufficiently 
unlikely to block the conclusion that the Plan is reasonably 
likely to succeed. 
We acknowledge that Grace has offered us little 
insight into the methodology used to arrive at the conclusion 
that $37.3 million provides an adequate reserve for the PD 
liability payments.  But the scale of related claims
16
 satisfies 
us that $1.6 billion in possible funding (an amount AMH has 
not refuted) has a reasonable likelihood of providing for all 
claims.  We therefore affirm the conclusion that the Plan is 
feasible. 
IV. 
 For the reasons discussed above, AMH has failed to 
demonstrate that the Plan should not have been confirmed.  
We will affirm the District Court’s holding. 
                                              
16
 As of June 2012, Grace had settled 407 claims for a 
total of $147 million, leading to an average payout of 
approximately $361,179 per claim.  W.R. Grace & Co., 475 
B.R. at 67.  Those claims included “(1) California State 
University and University of California for $1.4 million; (2) 
Pacific Freeholds Ltd., Inc. for $9,043,375; (3) various 
hospitals and healthcare facilities for $576,250; (4) several 
private commercial building owners in the United States for 
$16 million; and (5) building owners in Canada for $2.5 
million.”  Id. at 67 n.12. 
